Filling Spiritual Voids: #MeToo in the Buddhist Monastery
- Alex Van Egmond
- Oct 18, 2024
- 9 min read
Updated: Oct 20, 2024
In contemporary China, the atheistic stance of the Communist Party contributes to a spiritual void among the population. This stems from the disastrous policies of Mao Zedong, who attempted to completely replace religion with Marxist-socialist ideology, with the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) being the most extreme campaign.
However, the spiritual needs of the Chinese people could not be satisfied with dry political ideology. After Mao's death in 1976, the Communist Party shifted its approach, allowing more freedom to practice religion. One of the biggest beneficiaries of this change was Buddhism.
Since Xi Jinping took power, the Chinese Buddhist organization has received substantial financial and political support to fill this void. Even modern technology is being used to reach the people, but this support has also been tainted by corruption and scandals. The case of Abbot Shi Xuecheng is a clear example of this.
Text: Alex van Egmond
State and Dreams
'If you can't beat them, join them' must have been the thinking of the Communist Party (CCP) after 1978. Mao tried to completely eradicate religion, but under his successors, particularly Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, religion became institutionalized.
Five religious groups—Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Buddhism—were allowed. This means that these five groups could register and legally hold religious services. If you don’t belong to one of these groups, you are left out.
However, for popular folk religions, such as the worship of Mazu, the government sometimes turns a blind eye. These religious groups fall under the control of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, which implements the CCP's policies.
Initially, Xi Jinping continued the policies of his predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, but he has since diverged on several points. In 2016, Xi chaired the working group on religion and emphasized the importance of the 'Sinification of religion'. where doctrines and truths are interpreted in ways that align with China's needs.
This simply means that religion must conform to the party’s doctrine and the traditions of the dominant Han ethnic group. Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are identified by Xi as 'authentic' religions rooted in Chinese culture, which has led to greater tolerance for these three under his rule.
Conversely, Islamic groups (including the Uyghurs and Hui Muslims) and Christian groups face increasing repression. The government's promotion of Chinese customs and traditions aligns with the nationalist undertone Xi displays in his 'Chinese Dream'.
As early as 2012, before becoming the top leader, Xi promoted this ideal of a great revival of the Chinese nation. By now, this 'dream' has been concretely incorporated into the long-term strategy of the CCP.
For instance, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic, China aims to be an economic and military superpower. This vision calls for a strong nation with a population united under the leadership of the CCP.
For such a powerful China, the spread of Chinese values and traditional culture is essential—a task not only assigned to the government. On July 1, 2019, during the centenary of the party, Xi emphasized in his speech that China is united around a 'Chinese identity'. and that it is the responsibility of both the Chinese people and overseas Chinese to contribute to this great revival.
Xi consistently underscores the uniqueness of traditional Chinese culture. During an inspection of a national research program in May 2022, he referred to Chinese civilization as a 'unique spiritual identity of the Chinese nation'. This identity connects all Chinese people and, on paper, the 55 other ethnic minorities in China as well.
In practice, it is precisely the minorities who suffer the most, as the CCP attempts to assimilate everything that is not considered part of Han culture. Unfortunately, this is a recurring phenomenon throughout China's history.
Buddhism, which originated in India, also experienced a long period of repression before being accepted by the elite and the general populace. This acceptance was partly achieved through collaboration with Taoists and by borrowing elements from the Taoist canon.
Today, China has an estimated 185–220 million practitioners of Buddhism, and possibly even more. While Xi himself is not a practitioner, various sources indicate that he holds a genuine respect for Buddhism. It's therefore not surprising that this religious group has been assigned a role in addressing China's moral decline.
Monastery
One of the key objectives of the 2049 strategy is to achieve a technological edge over the rest of the world, and this is being applied in religious spheres as well. The Longquan Monastery, located about fifty kilometers northwest of central Beijing, introduced the robot Xian'er a few years ago.
Xian'er is a robot that can chant mantras and explain the basic principles of the faith. It draws from a database of answers provided by the former abbot Shi Xuecheng in response to questions, and it was developed in collaboration with Chinese universities and companies.
The intention is for Xian'er to be further developed and become fully autonomous in the future through artificial intelligence (AI). This sounds ambitious, and it certainly is. The Chinese government is investing heavily in AI, but this technology has its downsides.
For example, in 2017, two experimental QQ chat robots were shut down after their success backfired, as they began criticizing the Communist Party and forming opinions on sensitive issues such as corruption and democracy. For the Longquan Monastery, one can only hope that it can keep its robot under control.
Xian'er is not the only technological marvel the monastery is involved with. This model monastery also has various departments where students from prestigious universities work on developing apps, comics, animated films, and music videos.
These students stay in the monastery for some time and live in a Buddhist manner, engaging in meditation, workshops, and vegetarian meals.
In 2016, I had the opportunity to experience this for myself when I participated in an excursion to the monastery with a group of fellow teachers. I had previously visited as a tourist, but this time we gained access to the private quarters.
We even had a meeting with Abbot Xuecheng in person, the major proponent of all these new technological applications in the monastery.
Xuecheng became a monk in 1982 after living as a Buddhist layperson for several years. His mother and grandmother were also devoted to Buddhism. He came from a small village in Fujian Province and left for Beijing in 1984 after joining the monastery to study at the National Buddhist Academy.
Even before graduating, he became the abbot of Guanghua Monastery in Beijing. This rapid promotion indicates that he was ambitious and had a good sense for administrative matters.
As abbot, he quickly advanced in both the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the advisory body of the Standing Committee that presents proposals once a year, but is essentially a rubber stamp parliament.
In 2015, he became president of the BAC, and his fame soared to new heights. Ten years earlier, he had already become the abbot of Longquan Monastery. With political backing, Xuecheng renovated and significantly expanded the monastery.
In addition, he published several books on Buddhism and actively wrote on the monastery’s blog. Common themes included globalization, pollution, poverty alleviation, and intercultural religious dialogue, which garnered him much popularity among Chinese youth.
The Downfall
After the visit to the monastery, I went home with mixed feelings. The vegetarian meal in the canteen, which had to be eaten in silence, was of questionable quality. For instance, I discovered a hair in the soggy vegetables that were served to me.
In hindsight, I learned that the other teachers were also dissatisfied. The requirement for silence was probably not for nothing. Additionally, I hadn’t gained much insight into the fundamental principles of Buddhism, despite Abbot Xuecheng taking the time to meet with us.
During the meeting with Xuecheng, which took place in the square conference room of the monastery with a wide view over the valley, the cheerful abbot emphasized the importance of technology in spreading Buddhist values and reaching out to young people.
Xuecheng's speech about various noble goals was somewhat overshadowed by his tendency to brag about his numerous international trips.
Among other places, he had visited Utrecht (The Netherlands) to inaugurate the 'Longquan Tempel van Groot Mededogen' (Longquan Temple of Great Compassion), the first Chinese Buddhist monastery in Europe. Xuecheng's narrative remained stuck in platitudes and self-congratulation.
It wasn't until a courageous Serbian teacher threw a proverbial wrench into the works by questioning the relationship between the Chinese government and the monastery. The square shaped room finally got some stir.
Xuecheng's smile became a nervous one, and after some hesitation, he said that the monastery had a very good relationship with the government. He did not elaborate further. Coincidentally, it was also time for the next part of the tour, and our guide urged us to leave the room.
Two years later, I learned that Xuecheng had resigned from his positions as abbot and president of the BAC due to allegations of sexual misconduct. Two former monks from his monastery published these allegations along with statements from six nuns in a 95-page report on social media.
Following Xuecheng's resignation as president of the BAC, for which no official reason was given, the Longquan Monastery issued a press release denying the allegations.
The two former monks claimed to have based their accusations on fabricated evidence and were intent on tarnishing Xuecheng's character and leadership. Within China, the scandal gained considerable attention on the internet, partly because the Chinese #MeToo movement had gained momentum.
The report was quickly shared and discussed on WeChat and Weibo before the censors intervened and removed the report and all related discussions from the internet. The BAC subsequently initiated an investigation into the allegations against Xuecheng.
Future
Xuecheng's resignation was notable due to his position in the BAC and his ties to the government. He was the highest-ranking individual to fall under the influence of the Chinese #MeToo movement. A few weeks later, the BAC handed the investigation over to the State Administration for Religious Affairs, which officially charged Xuecheng.
According to the English-language Chinese newspaper Global Times, Xuecheng was suspected of 'violating Buddhist doctrine'. In addition to sexual misconduct, he was accused of constructing on the site of the Longquan Monastery without official permits and misusing public funds, leading to a police investigation against him as well.
While the investigation was ongoing, Xuecheng was sent back to Putian in Fujian Province, his birthplace. In 2018, the Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily (no longer available online) reported that Xuecheng still had a strong base in Fujian and quietly continued his activities there.
A year later, during the annual meeting of China's rubber stamp parliament, he was officially removed as a member of the CCP. Wang Zuoan, the highest official of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, remained silent when the media inquired about the status of the investigation into Xuecheng.
It seems that Xuecheng's resignation has prevented a loss of face for the BAC and the Longquan Monastery, but the reasons remained unclear.
At the time of writing this article, the investigation is still ongoing, and Xuecheng has not yet been convicted of his alleged misconduct.
A similar scandal involved Abbot Shi Yongxin of the famous Shaolin Monastery in Henan Province, also known as the 'CEO Monk' due to his involvement in numerous commercial projects. In 2015, he was suspected of embezzlement, extortion, and fathering two children with his mistresses. Two years later, he was acquitted of all charges.
In contrast to Xuecheng, he was even able to continue his duties during the ongoing investigation. This raises the question of whether Xuecheng was perhaps a political high-flyer who got too close to the fire and lacked the right connections to extricate himself from the predicament.
Regardless, it indicates how toxic and unpredictable the climate is at the top. In December 2021, Xi Jinping reiterated his desire for the 'sinicization of religion' during the National Congress on Religious Affairs, but this time the message was more forceful.
He spoke of the need to 'fully implement' the CCP's policies regarding religious affairs, aligned with the socialist society, where Chinese culture is paramount. In short, the party demands even greater control over religious matters.
The result of this vaguely formulated wish recently manifested in the closure of religious chat groups and a ban on disseminating religious content without official government approval.
Sinification needs to be implemented 'scientifically', in accordance with Marxist thought, reported Bitter Winter in March 2022. In this way, the government is slowly polishing its policy. Above all, sinicization is most clearly observed in the increasing repression of Tibetan Buddhism.
Although Tibetan Buddhism is one of the four major schools within Buddhism, it is not recognized as part of traditional Chinese culture by the government.
Last year, the Associated Press joined a heavily controlled media tour through Tibet and asked the abbot of the famous Jokhang Monastery whether the Dalai Lama was their spiritual leader.
“No”, he replied, “that is Xi Jinping”.
The future looks bleak for religious groups in China, regardless of whether they belong to traditional Chinese culture or not. It remains doubtful whether the party, with its entangled grip on society, will fill the spiritual void and counteract moral decline.
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